Social investment in Spain: How do solidarity mutual funds decide the allocation of solidarity funding between social economy organizations? by López Arceiz, F.J. et al.
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 00:0 2017 pp. 1–24
SOCIAL INVESTMENT IN SPAIN: HOW DO SOLIDARITY
MUTUAL FUNDS DECIDE THE ALLOCATION OF
SOLIDARITY FUNDING BETWEEN SOCIAL ECONOMY
ORGANIZATIONS?
by
Francisco J. LO´PEZ-ARCEIZ, Ana J. BELLOSTAS∗ and
Pilar RIVERA-TORRES
Universidad de Zaragoza, Spain
ABSTRACT: Solidarity mutual funds (SMFs) are a financial product oriented to-
ward funding social economy organizations (SEOs). The main characteristic of these
mutual funds, known in other countries as social investment, is that part of their man-
agement fees is allocated to support SEOs. In Spain, the criteria used in the allocation
process of these funds have not been studied. The aim of this paper is to analyze the de-
cision model of SMFs. To this end, we developed a logit regression model. The obtained
results show that the decision model of SMFs promotes the development of commercial
activity and favors a specific ideology and values and an exclusive relationship with
the main funders.
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1 Introduction
Nowadays, in the European Union, there is an ongoing debate between two approaches
of economic thought: neoliberalism and neo-Keynesianism (Patomaki 2009; Schmidt
2016). Neoliberalism tends to regard the market as a tool for the redistribution of wealth
and welfare, whereas neo-Keynesianism argues for the intervention of social agents
and governments as a way to combat market failures. Chaves et al. (1999) regarded
neo-Keynesianism as the basis of the European social economy due the economic
functions of the social economy. In their opinion, the social economy is a tool to promote,
among others, the distribution of wealth, the autonomy of regions, employment, and
sustainable development. As a consequence, social economy organizations (SEOs) are
promoted by the European Union as a response toward correcting social and regional
imbalances. SEOs are chosen as strategic instruments of social, economic, and fiscal
policies; they are flexible organizations with the capacity to develop multiobjective
management.
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Despite such promotion, Spanish SEOs have faced a drastic reduction of 11 per
cent on average in public subsidies in the last few years (PwC Foundation 2013). At the
same time, the Spanish government has decreased by 24.70 per cent public expenses
for social services and the promotion of employment, which SEOs rely on. Given this
situation, these entities must search for alternative funds in the financial markets. Fi-
nancial markets have evolved from a vision based exclusively on financial criteria to
one into which non-financial criteria have been introduced (Renneboog et al. 2008a).
This evolution led to the development of socially responsible investment. Under this
denomination, financial organizations have designed new socially responsible financial
products although entities that are into socially responsible need to develop new strate-
gies if they want to survive. The solidarity component is one step forward in the strategy
of these entities.
Solidarity funding can be a key tool in the social economy in the process of
economic recovery (Prouteau and Tchernonog 2015). However, the criteria used by
solidarity funders, such as solidarity mutual funds (SMFs), in deciding on the allocation
of this sort of funding are not known. The aim of the present study is to analyze the
decision model of SMFs and to determine the criteria applied by these funds in designing
the allocation of funding. To achieve this aim, we used the population of Spanish SMFs
and a sample consisting of 350 SEOs that they support. The obtained results show
that the decision model of SMFs promotes the development of commercial activity
and favors a specific ideology and values and an exclusive relationship with the main
funder.
The paper is structured as follows. The second section provides a review of the
research in this field and the various hypotheses studied in the present work. In
the third section, the data, variables, and descriptive statistics are presented to sup-
port the proposed hypotheses. The fourth section shows the results and provides the
conclusions.
2 Theoretical framework
2.1 Social economy organizations: Concept and characteristics
In Europe, SEOs are regarded as an alternative way to generate economic and
social welfare and as a new tool of European social policies (EU Strategy 2020). In
spite of this promotion by the European Union, however, relatively little is known about
the scale and characteristics of these entities (EESC 2015). This lack of knowledge has
its origin in the diversity of experiences at the regional level, as well as of national
economic structures, welfare systems, cultural traditions, and legal frameworks (Kerlin
2006; Quinta˜o 2007; Defourny and Nyssens 2008; Hulga˚rd 2010; Fayolle and Matlay
2010). Following the European trend, SEOs in Spain can be found among some worker-
owned entities, such as cooperatives, and some organizations, including foundations and
associations (EESC 2015; AECA 2015).
SEOs have a hybrid nature and are not aligned with the traditional idealized
categories, namely, the public, private, and nonprofit sectors (Billis 2010; Wilson and
Post 2013; Doherty et al. 2014). This hybrid character, in which economic and social
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Figure 1 – Classification criteria related to social economy organizations.
activities coincide, influences the mission and legal form of the organization (Emerson
2006). However, there is a divergence in the relationship between these activities and the
possible legal forms that these entities can adopt. Regarding the mission, some authors,
such as Porter and Kramer (2006, 2012) and, more recently, Doherty et al. (2014),
establish the possibility that these entities pursue social and economic aims at the same
time (dual mission). Consequently, under this approach, there is only one behavioral
model. In contrast, Borzaga and Galera (2014) and Pirson (2012) argue that a dual aim
is not possible in the practice. In this case, hybrid organizations will develop different
behaviors depending on their priority aim. Taking into account this last approach, Lo´pez-
Arceiz et al. (2016) distinguished three hybrid behavioral models that consider the role of
the social and economic mission: (a) socially responsible companies, (b) social enterprise,
and (c) market-oriented nonprofit.
If the legal nature is used as an alternative classification criterion, we can distin-
guish between public sector, for-profit private sector, and nonprofit private sector. In the
nonprofit private sector, we can find foundations and associations, whereas in the for-
profit sector, we have public companies, limited liability companies, and cooperatives,
among others. This categorization is based on the legal nature and not on the mission of
the entity. In other words, an entity with the same legal form can develop a dual mission
but can also develop a priority aim, be it social or economic. Thus, the legal nature is
not conditioned by the mission of the entity.
Figure 1 shows both criteria. A foundation or association will develop a priority
social aim although it can manage some resources for its economic activity. In this
case, the economic activity is a financial tool of the social aim. In contrast, a for-profit
private entity (such as a public company, limited liability company, or cooperative) will
pursue an imperative economic aim and could develop a social activity; such entity could
even have a priority social aim, such as sheltered workshops or work integration social
enterprises (WISEs). Therefore, the mission of the entity and the development of its
social and economic activities will not depend on its legal nature.
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The most controversial element in Figure 1 is the identification of a social en-
terprise. According to a recent map of social enterprises in Europe (Wilkinson et al.
2015), it is possible to consider as social enterprises some associations or foundations
and other for-profit private entities (public companies, limited liability companies, or co-
operatives). In all these entities, the social aim is always a priority, and the development
of continuous and stable economic activity is necessary (Lo´pez-Arceiz et al. 2016).
The origin of this controversy is the overlap between themission and the legal form
criteria. Some authors base their definitions of social enterprise on the legal form (AECA
2015). Under this approach, a social enterprise is defined as a legal entity originated in
the Third Sector that develops social and economic activities. However, other authors
(Bellostas et al. 2016; Lo´pez-Arceiz et al. 2016) base their definition of social enterprise on
the relationship between economic and social activities. Following this approach, social
enterprises, market-oriented nonprofits, and traditional nonprofits are considered as
SEOs because they have an imperative social aim. However, the role of the economic
activity differs. In a social enterprise, the economic activity is mandatory, whereas in a
market-oriented nonprofit, such activity is incidental. In contrast, a traditional nonprofit
does not develop any economic activity. This approach, which is based on the mission of
the entity, represents the hybrid nature of an SEO by reflecting its behavioral model.
The hybrid nature of an SEO can be defined based on three dimensions: social,
entrepreneurial, and inclusive (Defourny and Nyssens 2008). The social dimension of
these entities is defined by the aim and/or products delivered (Borzaga and Galera
2014). This dimension is more developed in traditional nonprofits because such entities
focus on a social aim. The economic or entrepreneurial dimension consists of carrying out
stable and continuous economic activities. This dimension is promoted specially in social
enterprises. Finally, the inclusive dimension refers to the participation of stakeholders
in the organization (Galera 2015). This aspect tends to be potentiated in all the entities
given that they are created to answer the needs of a broad spectrum of stakeholders.
These three dimensions thus provide the basic characterization of an SEO.
2.2 Funding social economy organizations in Spain: Solidarity mutual funds
The hybrid character of SEOs and the difficulty of differentiating between their
legal nature and mission can condition the type of funding available for these entities.
In this sense, Doherty et al. (2014) identify an advantage of this lack of definition, that
is, the possibility of obtaining funds from both market and nonmarket sectors. Tradi-
tionally, markets have proportionated funding through commercial banks and the stock
exchange. This sort of funding was designed to promote the economic viability of com-
panies and businesses (Kingston and Bolton 2004). Additionally, from the nonmarket
subsector, Public Administration and private savers have supported foundations and
associations through grants (Jaliu and Ravar 2013) and charitable funds (Kingston and
Bolton 2004). The key aim of these funders was to promote projects with social impact.
The change in European economic thought, oriented toward promoting sustain-
able socioeconomic activity (Cheruvalath 2016), has led financial markets and organi-
zations to offer products that combine the characteristics of traditional funding and
the typical elements of funding from the nonmarket subsector (Liket and Maas 2016).
Nowadays, commercial banks and financial markets compete to get socially responsible
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Table 1 – Developed strategies in mutual funds
Traditional Responsible Sustainable Thematic Solidarity Philanthropic
Aim Maximization
of financial
return
Restricted by
selective
criteria
Use of value
criteria
Cluster by
activity area
Funding of
social
projects
Creation of a
social
project
Example Fixed income
mutual
funds
Selective
funds drugs
industry
ASG mutual
funds
Ecological
mutual
funds
Solidarity
mutual
funds
Founding
Disbursed
funds
Sources: Own based on Bridges Venture 2012.
investors through financial innovations that serve as alternatives to traditional financial
products. Among these financial innovations, solidarity funding or social investment is
highlighted. This type of funding can be described as consisting of a range of activities
designed to motivate and mobilize business leaders to become a force toward positive
change in business practices for the benefit of stakeholders (Dillenburg et al. 2003). This
investment mode is developed under different types of financial products (including
mutual funds, pension plans, and philanthropic initiatives, among others).1
In Spain, solidarity investment is considered as part of the socially responsible
financial market (Lozano et al. 2006). In general, socially responsible investing applies
financial and nonfinancial criteria in the selection of socially responsible companies
to include in their portfolio (Renneboog et al. 2008a, 2008b; Crifo and Mottis 2016).
However, solidarity investment pursues a complementary aim, the funding of a social
project or initiative. When the solidarity investment takes the form of an SMF, the fund
managers donate part of their management fees to an identified SEO (INVERCO 1999,
2014). According to the Spanish legal framework (Law 35/2003 – Collective Investment
Institutions Act), mutual funds require the convergence of two agents: Holder banks
(commercial banks, saving banks and credit unions) and manager societies. The holder
bank has to guard the financial assets which compose the portfolio of the mutual fund
while the manager society decides the investment strategy.2 In the case of SMFs, the
manager society has to decide the entities which are beneficiaries of the management
fees, this behavior being the main characteristic of these mutual funds.
As a consequence, SMFs are a step forward in socially responsible investment
(Bridges Ventures 2012). Table 1 shows the different strategies that can be developed
by mutual funds in the context of socially responsible investment.
As we can observe in Table 1, SMFs are a financial product that focuses not only
on the portfolio composition according to the traditional criteria of maximum return for
1 Different solidary financial products can be found worldwide. Je´gourel and Maveyraud
(2009) cited a type of solidarity mutual fund in France. In other countries, this product is known
as impact investment (Stagars 2014; Wilson 2014).
2 Valor et al. (2007) detected that commercial banks are leaders of Socially Responsible
Investment market in Spain. About ten years later, this situation is still true. Santander and
BBVA are the main entities in the Spanish market. However, when we study solidarity mutual
funds (also called sharing funds), we detect a strong participation of saving banks and credit
unions. In fact, approximately 50 per cent of the solidarity mutual funds which survive the
economic crisis has its origin in the latter entities (Bellostas and Lo´pez-Arceiz 2014).
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a determined level of risk. Rather, these mutual funds include a new element: funding
social projects. The socially responsible market in Spain has undergone a gradual evo-
lution. In 2003, a 20 per cent of SMFs added the solidarity component to their strategy
(Lozano et al. 2006). By 2014, mutual funds with the solidarity component had reached
about 50 per cent (Social Investment Forum 2014). Solidarity investment, and SMFs,
has a more ambitious pursuit of funding an SEO. Thus, the decision-making process is
more complex because these entities have to decide on the portfolio composition and the
allocation of management fees among a pleiad of SEOs. Moreover, the managers of these
mutual funds have to consider that an SEO can be valued based on different dimensions
(economic, social, and inclusive).
If the decision model of the SMF is similar to that of a traditional commercial
bank, it is reasonable to consider the level of economic activity developed by the SEO as
the most important element. To test this statement, we propose the following working
hypothesis:
H1: The economic activity of the social economy organization is a decision criterion
when an ESFM determines the allocation of solidarity funding.
We do not expect H1 to be rejected because the level of economic activity of the
social entity could be a decision criterion for an SMF. However, if an SMF considered
only the economic activity of the SEO, this kind of financial product would be considered
as a marketing tactic of the holder bank, with the social entity being a customer of
the financial institution. In this case, the holder bank invests in marketing assets and
expects these assets to contribute to profits in the short run and to provide potential
for growth and sustained profits in the long run (Rust et al. 2004). In this approach, an
SMF could be considered as a kind of premium or customer loyalty product for social
entities that maintain positive cash flows in the holder bank.
Given the nature of an SEO, the social dimension is an important aspect of this
kind of entity. This dimension is usually described as the number of attended users or
the creation of employment (Mano 2014, 2015; Lo´pez-Arceiz et al. 2016). Some studies in
the framework of microfinance institutions have shown that both elements are measure-
ments of the level of commitment to the social aim and that these elements are taken
into account in the decision-making process (Evans 1999; Navajas et al. 2000; Gutierrez-
Nieto et al. 2009). In the case of an SMF, the social activity should be a criterion in its
decision model. We therefore test our second hypothesis:
H2: The social activity of the social economy organization is a decision criterion when
an ESFM determines the allocation of solidarity funding.
An SEO pursues a social mission; thus, it is difficult for the funder not to take into
account this characteristic. For this reason, we expect H2 to be supported. If an SEO is
able to employ more human resources or attend to a higher number of users, its ability
to attract solidarity funding will increase. However, if this was the unique criterion, the
behavior of these entities would be based on the allocation criteria which would be closer
to a public grant. In this case, the SMF would become a kind of public agency tasked
with monitoring the allocation of funding.
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Finally, the inclusive dimension could also influence the decision of an SMF. This
aspect has been studied in relation to the portfolio composition of ethical/socially re-
sponsible mutual funds (Entine 2003; Mun˜oz-Torres et al. 2004; Girard et al. 2007).
Previous research has shown that ideological aspects related to the investee companies
can determine the portfolio composition of an ethical/socially responsible mutual fund
(Bellostas and Lo´pez-Arceiz 2014). Consequently, the level of participation of the organi-
zation stakeholders could also affect the decision-making processes of the mutual fund.
For this reason, we test the following hypothesis:
H3: The participation of the stakeholders or inclusive dimension in the social economy
organization is a decision criterion when an ESFM determines the allocation of
solidarity funding.
In the context of SEOs, this dimension can be related to constraints in the distri-
bution of profits, the organizational autonomy, and, especially, the degree of integration
of the needs of stakeholders. If an SMF only financed an SEO that enables the fund to
participate in the corporate bodies, the SEO could be considered as an affiliated company
of the mutual fund. In this case, the allocation criterion would be something discretional
based on the trust and interpersonal relationship between the managers of the SEO and
of the mutual fund.
In short, the characteristics of an SEO could be an active component of the deci-
sion model of SMFs. In any case, we expect the manager of an SMF to consider these
three dimensions when deciding on the allocation of solidarity funding. However, the
promotion of one dimension to the detriment of the rest would introduce disequilibrium
in the allocation criteria as it has been exposed.
3 Methodology
3.1 Sample
The studied sample consists of the population of SMFs in Spain. According to
the National Stock Market Commission (Comisio´n Nacional del Mercado de Valores,
CNMV), there are at present eight SMFs, which support the economic and social activi-
ties of 951 SEOs. These social organizations are heterogeneous in their activities: 72 per
cent of which are related to health care, 25.43 per cent to cooperation and development,
and the rest to social services (1.14%), religious activity (0.57%), education (0.29%), trade
unions (0.29%), and cultural activities (0.29%). There is diversity at the regional level.
However, there is a notable concentration in three areas: Madrid, Catalonia, and Pays
Basque.
We obtained information on the financial activities of the different solidarity
mutual funds from the National Stock Market Commission. Information on the so-
cial entities was extracted from the annual accounts and activity reports of the SEOs,
which were obtained from corporate registers and the different ministries and regional
governments.3 All in all, data for a sample of 365 SEOs was collected.
3 This information was extracted from a public register known as Protectorado de Funda-
ciones and may have come from either the Ministry of Justice of the Central Government or the
Department of Justice of the Regional Governments.
© 2017 The Authors
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics © 2017 CIRIEC
8 FRANCISCO J. LO´PEZ-ARCEIZ, ANA J. BELLOSTAS AND PILAR RIVERA-TORRES
3.2 Main variables
Taking into account the dimensions of an SEO, we propose the following
variables:
- Economic activity. The measurement of the economic activity in an organization
can be developed from two alternative models (Ortas and Moneva 2011): mar-
ket valuation and accounting valuation. According to Van Beurden and Go¨ssling
(2008), accounting measurements offer an assessment of the efficiency of the com-
pany decision-making process, whereas measurements based on market value
provide the perceptions of the participants in the financial markets.
In this study, given the variety of legal forms, accountingmeasurements are used,
particularly return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). These indicators
have been used in previous research within the framework of SEOs as indicators
of economic efficiency (Ramayah et al. 2011; Sanchis-Palacio et al. 2013; Tan and
Yoo 2015). However, although ROA and ROE incorporate the idea of efficiency, they
could be biased by the denominators. Thus, two measurements of economic activity
are added, net sales (ln(sales)) and net profit (ln(net profit)). These indicators have
also been used in previous papers (Di Zhang and Swanson 2013; Rahim et al. 2015;
Bellostas et al. 2016).
- Social activity. The concept of social activity originated in the field of economic
research over 20 years ago; however, thus far, there is no generally accepted
way to measure this variable (Bellostas et al. 2016). In general, SEOs measure
social activity in relation to the human resources employed and involved in the
organization (employees, volunteers, and end users). This approachwas developed
by academics and practitioners. In the academia, for example, Mano (2014, 2015)
and Lo´pez-Arceiz et al. (2016) argued that the levels of employment, volunteering,
and users are proxies of the generation of social activity by an SEO. Among
practitioners, some legal frameworks established this measurement criterion.
Specifically, in Spain, resolutions on March 26, 2013 (BOE no. 85 on 9 April 2013,
and BOE no. 86 on 10 April 2013), also followed this orientation.
In the present paper, these indicators are relativized by constructing three
families of ratios: (a) the ratios of assets (ACT/T), gross income (IE/T), and public
grants (SUBV/T) to employees; (b) the ratios of assets (ACT/V), gross income (IE/V),
and public grants (SUBV/V) to volunteers; and (c) the ratios of assets (ACT/U),
gross income (IE/U), and public grants (SUBV /U) to users. The level of assets
considers the investment of an SEO by human resource or attended user. The gross
income takes into account the capability of the organization in the generation of
growth. Finally, the public grants per human resource or attended user measures
the level of usage of public funding by the entity.
- Inclusive dimension or stakeholder participation. The degree of participation of
stakeholders measures the level of inclusion of the needs of the SEO environ-
ment. The first indicator used in this study is related to the values and ideology
of the SEO. The SEO ideology was defined by looking at the board composition.
We codified on a scale the different political ideologies in Spain (from 0–4, with
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0 representing the most progressive political tendency and 4 indicating the most
conservative one). We defined a specific value depending on the general tendency
of the members of board.4 This definition was based on Gilman (1979), who estab-
lished that the distinction between cultural conservatism versus progressivism
should consider attitudes in favor of social change and individual rights and free-
dom. Affiliation with a political movement could represent this dimension and the
values of the organization.
The second indicator that we propose is the number of financial stakeholders
in the organization. The number of funders of the entities is determined based
on the information contained in their annual reports. This variable can indicate
the level of exclusiveness of some funders. Due to the importance of funding, and
according to Powell and Friedkin (1987) and Smylie and Corcoran (2009), non-
profits often adapt their behavior to the interests and expectations of their fun-
ders. This variable measures the degree of adaption; thus, if we find only one
funder, it is reasonable to assume that the adaptation to this funder will be
higher.
Another aspect that may define the tendency toward increased confidence in
stakeholders is the level of transparency within the SEO. Gandia (2008, 2009) and
Saxton et al. (2011, 2014) considered an entity as showing transparent behavior
when it encourages the disclosure of accounting information through the Internet.5
Therefore, this study identifies online accessibility as a third indicator of the partic-
ipation of stakeholders or the inclusive dimension.
Finally, a fourth indicator of this dimension is used, that is, the integration of
the general interest in the mission and aim of the SEO. This variable is related to
the legal nature of the entity and was codified in this study as either 1 (general
interest) or 0 (non-general interest). According to the Spanish legal framework, if
the SEO is a foundation, it must take into account the promotion of the general
interest.6 In the case of associations, the promotion of the general interest depends
on the stamp of public utility.7 For commercial companies, we considered the gen-
eral interest to be promoted when the legal framework puts it ahead of particular
interests.8
4 The political tendencies of the members of the board were determined from their electoral
candidatures, which are public and free.
5 In relation to accessibility, we considered the websites of the SEOs. Each item represents
the number of clicks in the website from a generic searcher to the annual report. For an entity
without a website, the code was 0.
6 Ley 50/2002, de 26 de diciembre, de Fundaciones (Law 50/2002, 26 December, of Founda-
tions) [BOE nu´m. 310 de 27 de Diciembre de 2002].
7 Ley Orga´nica 1/2002, de 22 de marzo, reguladora del Derecho de Asociacio´n (Law 1/2002,
22 March, of Association Right) [BOE nu´m. 73 de 26 de Marzo de 2002].
8 For instance, in the case of sheltered workshops, the Spanish legal framework introduces
some constraints in the promotion of the general interest (RD 2273/1985, de 4 de diciembre, de
centros especiales de empleo de minusva´lidos-RD 2273/1985, 4 December, of sheltered workshops
for disabled people) [BOE 9 de Diciembre de 1985].
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3.3 Data analysis
Given the objective of this study, we started by carrying out a descriptive analysis
of the indicators in terms of their position measures. ANOVA is used to examine the
differences in economic and social activity between the entities invested in by each
mutual fund (F1–F8). Tejedor (2012) identifies this test as a suitable analysis when the
researcher is interested about the comparison between different samples. In this case,
we compare those entities which got funding from a specific mutual fund and the entities
which were not beneficiaries.
To estimate the probability of obtaining funds from each SMF, a set of binary logis-
tic (logit) regressions is specified for each SMF. This sort of regression is recommended
when the dependent variable has a binary composition (Silva and Barroso 2004). This
methodology is preferred to the stratification trough categorical variables of the model
variables because this technic enables to work with medium-sized samples and preserve
the quantitative nature of the model variable. In our case, the logit model describes
the relationship between the dichotomous dependent variable, which takes a value of 1
when the social entity perceives economic support from a specific SMF or a value of 0
otherwise, and k explanatory variables X1, X2, . . . , Xk. Because the dependent variable
is binary (dichotomous), it follows the Bernoulli distribution; thus, Pj = P(Yj = 1) is the
probability of obtaining funding from a specific SMF, and (1 – Pj) is the probability of
non-funding. The estimated model can be expressed as
ln
[
p(Yj = 1)
1− p(Yj = 1)
]
=
n∑
i=1
βi
∗Xi + ε, (1)
whereYj is the binary endogenous variable, and the subscript j represents each SMF. The
exogenous variables are represented by Xi, with ε indicating the random disturbance.
The parameters β of the model measure the increase in the probability of receiving
funds. In other words, the parameters are an indicator of the impact of the economic
activity, social activity, and inclusive dimension on the funding obtained by each SEO.
We have specified two types of model according to Berman and Wang (2011). The broad
model includes all variables which have been exposed in the previous section, while the
core model only includes those variables which are relevant in terms of the parametric
t-test. This technic enables us to eliminate irrelevant variables, decreasing the variance
of the parameters (Verbeek 2008). We have used the software SPSS 22.0 to develop the
exposed data analysis.
4 Results
Table 2 shows a first approximation of the data, describing the position measure-
ments by SMF and the results of the ANOVA test. This table is organized into three
sections: economic activity, social activity, and inclusive dimension of the entity.
Regarding the economic activity, we can observe different results between the an-
alyzed entities. In general, SMFs tend to fund companies with similar levels of economic
profitability [min. ROA: −0.125%, max. ROA: 0.029%] and financial return [min. ROE:
−0.458%, max. ROE: 0.121%]. The ANOVA test shows no differences between SMFs
© 2017 The Authors
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics © 2017 CIRIEC
SOCIAL INVESTMENT IN SPAIN 11
Ta
bl
e
2
–
D
es
cr
ip
tiv
e
st
at
is
tic
s
an
d
A
N
OV
A
te
st
Va
ria
b
le
F1
F2
F3
F4
F5
F6
F7
F8
A
N
O
VA
Ec
on
om
ic
R
et
ur
n
on
as
se
ts
0.
00
1
−0
00
7
−0
.1
25
−0
.3
48
0.
00
8
0.
01
4
0.
02
9
0.
01
8
–
ac
tiv
ity
R
et
ur
n
on
eq
ui
ty
−0
.0
02
−0
00
7
−0
.1
08
−0
.3
56
0.
00
8
0.
12
1
0.
02
7
−0
.4
58
–
N
et
sa
le
s
17
.5
99
16
35
4
12
.5
79
13
.0
91
18
.9
69
16
.8
70
13
.1
82
14
.1
09
∗∗
∗
N
et
p
ro
fit
13
.9
37
17
35
9
–
10
.6
64
18
.1
49
12
.9
91
9.
54
0
10
.6
74
∗∗
∗
So
ci
al
ac
tiv
ity
R
ot
at
io
n
A
ss
et
s/
W
or
ke
rs
54
7,
03
7.
38
3
1,
30
9,
89
9.
23
5
7,
13
6,
96
6.
14
6
21
9,
41
7.
99
9
1,
30
9,
89
9.
23
5
56
3,
31
0.
00
9
50
,9
60
.4
95
6
22
8,
51
2.
33
1
–
R
ot
at
io
n
A
ss
et
s/
Vo
lu
nt
ee
rs
24
1,
88
5.
51
8
71
3,
78
6.
15
8
–
27
4,
48
5.
21
2
3,
38
8,
65
2.
36
9
3,
81
7,
07
7.
56
7
–
10
3,
30
7.
64
2
–
R
ot
at
io
n
A
ss
et
s/
U
se
rs
2,
05
2,
72
7.
26
2
38
,6
44
.4
62
60
5,
23
1.
06
3
73
,0
76
.5
05
62
.0
15
3,
30
6.
24
4
34
.8
79
10
,8
49
.0
42
–
R
ot
at
io
n
N
et
In
co
m
e/
W
or
ke
rs
35
3,
29
6.
86
8
16
0,
03
5.
70
7
13
5,
14
1.
63
8
12
6,
93
0.
13
3
16
0,
03
5.
90
7
18
4,
47
6.
98
3
49
,7
52
.2
19
57
,8
24
.7
21
–
R
ot
at
io
n
N
et
In
co
m
e/
Vo
lu
nt
ee
rs
16
0,
60
7.
53
3
32
5,
49
5.
27
5
–
13
9,
09
7.
99
3
32
6,
17
8.
84
8
2,
26
4,
62
6.
77
3
25
,5
08
.8
45
33
,5
50
.8
98
–
R
ot
at
io
n
N
et
In
co
m
e/
U
se
rs
3,
08
5,
51
5.
70
4
6,
57
1.
59
2
3,
88
5.
82
9
30
,2
19
.0
93
36
,4
69
3,
96
0.
00
9
37
.0
63
5,
18
3.
42
4
–
R
ot
at
io
n
P
ub
lic
G
ra
nt
s/
W
or
ke
rs
9,
08
1.
21
1
49
,0
66
.8
57
–
29
,6
77
.9
71
49
,0
66
.8
57
91
,8
79
.8
25
10
,5
40
.2
98
24
,1
64
.7
88
–
R
ot
at
io
n
P
ub
lic
G
ra
nt
s/
Vo
lu
nt
ee
rs
6,
63
8.
25
6
94
,4
60
.9
28
–
68
,4
68
.6
07
94
,7
71
.8
21
89
3,
92
1.
98
9
14
,3
67
.7
08
14
,4
94
.9
89
–
R
ot
at
io
n
P
ub
lic
G
ra
nt
s/
U
se
rs
36
4,
22
5.
61
4
91
64
–
4,
57
8.
60
9
12
.4
97
94
5.
49
0
7.
09
8
3,
09
6.
04
5
–
In
cl
u
si
ve
Id
eo
lo
g
y
3.
00
0
25
00
3.
00
0
0.
07
4
4.
00
0
2.
00
0
3.
00
0
1.
00
0
∗∗
∗
di
m
en
si
on
N
um
b
er
of
fu
nd
er
s
1.
00
0
25
00
1.
00
0
1.
02
5
4.
00
0
1.
47
1
1.
00
0
1.
00
0
–
A
cc
es
si
b
ili
ty
1.
00
0
05
00
0.
00
0
0.
80
9
1.
00
0
1.
00
0
1.
00
0
1.
00
0
–
P
ub
lic
ut
ili
ty
0.
33
3
00
00
0.
00
0
0.
28
2
0.
00
0
0.
11
8
0.
00
0
0.
04
4
–
Ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s
A
ct
iv
ity
S
al
ud
S
.S
oc
ia
le
s
S
.S
oc
ia
le
s
S
al
ud
S
.S
oc
ia
le
s
C
oo
p
.I
nt
er
.
S
al
ud
S
al
ud
–
o
ft
he
en
tit
y
R
eg
io
n
B
ar
ce
lo
na
M
ad
rid
B
ilb
ao
M
ad
rid
M
ad
rid
M
ad
rid
B
ar
ce
lo
na
M
ad
rid
–
∗∗
∗ 0
.0
1.
© 2017 The Authors
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics © 2017 CIRIEC
12 FRANCISCO J. LO´PEZ-ARCEIZ, ANA J. BELLOSTAS AND PILAR RIVERA-TORRES
when these ratios are taken into account (p-value > 0.10). Thus, the achieved return is
not a distinctive criterion for SMFs. However, different results are obtained when net
sales and net profit are considered, with the ANOVA test showing significant differences
between the analyzed SMFs (p-value < 0.01). The analysis of both items indicates that
SMFs tend to fund entities that are able to create cash flows because all the SMFs show
ratios higher than one [min. net sales: 12.579, max. net sales: 18.969; min. net profit:
9.540, max. net profit: 18.149]. In other words, SMFs promote the creation of economic
activity but are not concerned with the level of efficiency achieved by the social entity.
The social activity is not a distinctive element between SMFs. The ANOVA test
shows that the decision to fund a specific social entity does not depend on the level
of social activity developed (p-value > 0.10). Thus, we can affirm that, in general, the
decision to fund a particular social entity is independent of the level of social activity,
which is defined as investment, income, or public support by a human resource or user.
Finally, Table 2 also shows the impact of the proxies of the inclusive dimension
and the characteristics of the social entity on the allocation of solidarity funds. The
data indicate that SMFs prefer to fund activities related to health or social services and
that they favor entities located in developed economic regions (Madrid, Catalonia, or
Pays Basque). Moreover, the only notable characteristic is the ideology (p-value < 0.01).
Hence, SMFs tend to fund entities with an ideology and values similar to their own.
Other aspects, such as the number of funders, accessibility, or public utility, are not
influential in the decision to fund an entity.
The descriptive statistics provide evidence of a single decision model in the distri-
bution of solidarity funds. In general, SMFs do not take into account social achievements,
but they promote entities that develop economic activity and share their ideological char-
acteristics. In any case, this preliminary evidence needs to be tested.
Thus, a set of logistic regression models is developed to test the results. Tables 3–5
show the goodness of fit and the different estimated parameters. Specifically, Tables 3
and 4 present the results for economic and social activity, and Table 5 shows the results
for the inclusive dimension.
In relation to the goodness of fit, the different models show an acceptable fit
when the explained variable is part of the decision criteria of the SMF (Nagelkerke’s
R2 > 0.50). For all SMFs, a broad model and a core model are estimated. The core model
includes only those parameters that have a significant influence in the probability of
obtaining funding from an ESFM. The interpretation of the parameters has to consider
the logistic component of the model; thus, a negative sign for a parameter means that
the indicator decreases the probability of obtaining funding for these entities, whereas
a positive sign indicates otherwise.
Firstly, it should be noted that the SMFs F3, F5, and F7 fund only one entity. For
F3 and F7, this entity is a foundation created by the holder of the SMF, whereas F5
funds a generic entity and follows the policy defined by F2, with similar values for some
items (see Table 1). For this reason, in this first group, the decision is ex ante and not
dependent on the activity of the SEO. In such cases, a social entity could find it difficult
to obtain funds from these SMFs.
Regarding the economic activity, we can observe that all SMFs apply this element
in their decision-making process (p-value < 0.05). In particular, SMFs take into account
© 2017 The Authors
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Table 3 – Decisional model mutual funds: economic activity
Mutual fund Estimator year Return on assets Return on equity Net sales Net profit R2
F1 Est.2013 −17.306 −14.938 −0.547 0.430 0.956
Est.2013 – – −0.305∗∗∗ – 0.951
Est.2012 −6.060 −0.033 −0.530∗ 0.249 0.962
Est.2012 – – −0.354∗∗∗ – 0.960
Est.2011 −12.186 −0.026 −0.501∗∗ 0.234 0.970
Est.2011 – – −0.363∗∗∗ – 0.968
Est.2010 −2.810 −1.788 −0.640∗∗ 0.391 0.970
Est.2010 – – −0.358∗∗∗ – 0.967
Est.2009 −8.367 −0.387 −0.571∗∗ 0.321 0.969
Est.2009 – – −0.357∗∗∗ – 0.966
F2 Est.2013 1.067 −1.929 −0.111 −0.326 0.973
Est.2013 – – – −0.475∗∗∗ 0.973
Est.2012 0.281 −0.149 −0.553∗ 0.188 0.971
Est.2012 – – −0.392∗∗∗ – 0.970
Est.2011 1.321 0.049 −0.944∗∗∗ 0.583∗∗ 0.980
Est.2011 – – −0.930∗∗∗ 0.561∗∗ 0.979
Est.2010 −0.319 −0.068 −0.618∗∗ 0.254 0.973
Est.2010 – – −0.389∗∗∗ – 0.972
Est.2009 4.619 −0.428 −0.794∗ 0.452 0.979
Est.2009 – – −0.381∗∗∗ – 0.974
F4 Est.2013 −0.208 −0.484 0.425∗∗ −0.378 0.643
Est.2013 – – 0.133∗∗∗ – 0.620
Est.2012 4.574 −0.069 0.222∗ −0.082 0.735
Est.2012 – – 0.175∗∗∗ – 0.730
Est.2011 8.444∗ 0.003 0.428∗∗∗ −0.397∗∗ 0.728
Est.2011 – – 0.362∗∗∗ −0.265∗ 0.711
Est.2010 2.204 1.294 0.391∗∗∗ −0.325∗∗ 0.727
Est.2010 – – 0.162∗∗∗ – 0.704
Est.2009 1.020 0.245 0.421∗∗∗ −0.356∗∗ 0.719
Est.2009 – – 0.399∗∗∗ −0.319∗∗ 0.715
F6 Est.2013 −0.273 1.457 −0.225 0.089 0.690
Est.2013 – – −0.148∗∗∗ – 0.681
Est.2012 −6.632 1.246∗ −0.146 −0.024 0.731
Est.2012 – – −0.166∗∗∗ – 0.702
Est.2011 −19.277∗∗ 0.007 −0.240∗∗ 0.162 0.767
Est.2011 −16.815∗∗ – −0.129∗∗∗ – 0.763
Est.2010 −1.913 −1.061 −0.194∗ 0.060 0.717
Est.2010 – – −0.163∗∗∗ – 0.706
Est.2009 −7.783 −0.276 −0.313∗∗∗ 0.242 0.718
Est.2009 – – −0.160∗∗∗ – 0.697
F8 Est.2013 −0.727 −6.336 −0.445∗ 0.394 0.796
Est.2013 – – −0.179∗∗∗ – 0.781
Est.2012 −3.823 0.043 −0.308∗ 0.080 0.894
Est.2012 – – −0.261∗∗∗ – 0.893
Est.2011 −2.921 −0.013 −0.433∗∗∗ 0.293 0.858
Est.2011 – – −0.224∗∗∗ – 0.850
Est.2010 −1.468 −0.963 −0.480∗∗∗ 0.326 0.891
Est.2010 – – −0.244∗∗∗ – 0.884
Est.2009 0.332 −0.150 −0.327∗ 0.096 0.898
Est.2009 – – −0.257∗∗∗ – 0.898
∗0.10; ∗∗0.05; ∗∗∗0.01
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the ability of an entity to promote sales. The Spanish SMFs, with the exception of F4
(see Table 4), tend to potentiate SEOs with low sales growth (est. 2009 <0.00; est. 2013
<0.00). Thus, the support of an SMF is perceived as a kind of substitutive funding for
economic activity. Only F4, the holder of which is a commercial bank, promotes the
development of economic activity (est. 2009 >0.00; est. 2013 >0.00).
The analysis of the social activity indicates diversity in SMF behaviors. It
is interesting to note that two SMFs, F2 and F8, do not consider social activ-
ity when they decide on the allocation of solidarity funding (see Tables 3 and
4). This idearium is not rare among Spanish SMFs given that two other funds
consider social activity only in special circumstances. As shown in Table 4, F4
started using social criteria, such as the result of economic recession (p-value
2009 > 0.10, p-value 2010 > 0.10). Further, Table 4 shows that F1 applied social criteria
in the worst years of the economic recession (p-value 2009 < 0.10, p-value 2012 < 0.10).
In both cases, these SMFs tended to use the attended users as criterion, potentiating
entities with a high level of income per user (est. >0.00). A positive sign indicates that
when the SMF decides to promote a social entity, it does not consider other social ele-
ments, such as the volunteers or workers (p-value> 0.10). However, a different behavior
is observed with F6, which also considers aspects related to volunteers (est. >0.00) and
workers (est. 2011 >0.00).
Finally, Table 5 shows the impact of the inclusive dimension of the SEO. The
descriptive statistics indicate that the ideology of the SMF is one of its most impor-
tant characteristics (p-value < 0.01). The negative sign for F4 (est. −6.855) means
that this SMF tends to fund entities whose management board includes members of
social democratic political parties. The positive sign (est. >0.00) indicates the oppo-
site; that is, the SMF tends to promote entities managed by members of conserva-
tive political parties. The logit regression also shows that the number of funders is
the second consideration of a social entity seeking funding from an SMF (p-value <
0.01). In general, the estimated parameters are negative (est. <0.00); thus, SMFs pre-
fer funding one social entity exclusively. An exception is F4, which promotes entities
that use funds from different suppliers. Other characteristics, such as accessibility of
the entity or public utility declaration, are residual aspects that not all SMFs take into
account.
Our results therefore indicate that when deciding to fund a social entity, an SMF
can have three possible behaviors:
(a) In one group of SMFs (F3, F5 and F7), the decision to fund an SEO is ex ante. These
SMFs promote an entity that is related to their holder or has significant presence
in the Spanish society. They do not consider the social or economic activity of the
entity.
(b) A second group of SMFs (F2 and F8) considers only the level of economic activity,
understood as net sales, promoted by the SEO. One possible explanation for this
model is the necessity of gaining customer loyalty. In this group, the SMF could
be a strategic tool in the marketing policy of the holder bank.
(c) Finally, a third group (F1, F4 and F6) takes into account the economic and so-
cial elements of the entity. This group considers the attended users and/or as-
pects related to volunteers or workers as factors in the allocation of solidarity
funds.
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In all cases, three common elements can be observed: the promotion of commercial
activity, the ideology, and the relationships with other funders. These three elements
are the general characteristics that allow us to model the behavior of solidarity mutual
funds.
5 Conclusions and implications
The obtained results indicate that SMFs tend to fund SEOs with higher levels
of development of commercial activity and favor those SEOs that share their specific
ideology and values and have an exclusive relationship with the main funder. Some
unique characteristics in the behavior of some mutual funds are observable. These
characteristics define the mutual fund and its idea of solidarity.
In many cases, the economic activity of the SEO is found to be a decision crite-
rion when the mutual fund designs its allocation of funding. Thus, the mutual fund is
perceived as a part of the marketing policy of the holder bank. This result brings to
light a new way to obtain a competitive advantage. That is, if the mutual fund adopts
a solidarity component, the holder bank will have the opportunity to attract SEOs as
customers, and the solidarity component will thus represent an added value in rela-
tion to competitors. As a consequence, the concept of solidarity of the mutual fund will
no longer exist because solidarity will become merely a brand oriented toward gaining
customers.
In the general model, the promotion of the participation of stakeholders, specifi-
cally financial stakeholders, is observed to be a decision criterion for SMFs. However,
the mutual fund is not interested in accessibility or supporting the general interest.
In Spain, SMFs foster social entities that share their values and ideology. This result
is particularly worrying if we consider that, in general, the social activity of the SEO
is not a decision criterion. In other words, the users or human resources are not in-
cluded in the definition of solidarity as applied in Spanish SMFs. Therefore, there is
no guarantee that this financial product will fulfill the objectives that motivated its
creation.
These results have two implications. Mutual funds related to socially responsible
investment have created mechanisms to ensure that socially responsible companies
are included in their portfolios. Thus, they should consider the possible application of
these mechanisms in the allocation of solidarity funding. For instance, the definition
of an idearium or the composition of a solidarity board could serve as alternatives in
the selection of an SEO. The idearium is a document that defines the principles that
govern the concept of solidarity of the mutual fund, whereas the solidarity board is a
sort of control board tasked with monitoring the allocation decisions. These practices
are currently being implemented in socially responsible investment (Argandon˜a 2000;
De la Cuesta 2005) and can be easily applied to solidarity funding.
Moreover, it is necessary to train the staff and, especially, the managers of SMFs
so that they would recognize the utility of the information provided by social rat-
ing agencies (Sihna 2006). Of course, such usefulness requires a process of prepara-
tion that starts in the SEO. If the SMFs promote the verification of their activities,
the objectivity of their allocation decision will increase. Thus, any social entity that
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seeks to obtain solidarity funding should know these possibilities and which aspects to
promote.
Finally, we note some limitations of our study. First, our paper is centered in Spain.
Thus, the cultural environment and specific aspects of the Spanish legal framework
could condition our results. Moreover, our study covered a specific period characterized
by an economic crisis. For these reasons, further research about this financial product
is required given that SMFs could represent a key tool in the economic recovery of the
nonprofit sector.
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